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Commodity prices have been on an upward trend since early 
2009, following the sharp drop in late 2008 as the financial 
crisis unfolded. In the second half of 2010, commodity prices 
began rising rapidly, particularly for food and oil (Figure 15). 
The most important factor underpinning the food price surges 
are weather-related supply shocks in key producing countries 
since June 2010. Production shortfalls in wheat, barley and 
other grains occurred in net cereals exporters such as Russia 
and Ukraine. Additionally, Russia imposed a wheat export 
ban in August, and yields were disappointing in Europe and 
North America which are major net cereal exporting regions. 
These factors, which outweighed favorable production 
outcomes elsewhere (e.g. Argentina and Australia), induced 
large draw downs in food stocks thereby tightening the global 
demand and supply balance. Another leading factor has been 
the weakening of the US dollar since mid-September, which 
continues to sustain the prices of nearly all agricultural and 
non-agricultural commodities. Strong economic growth, 
particularly in emerging economies during 2010, has also 
contributed to the rise in commodity prices. 
As with food prices, energy prices have also risen in the 
second half of 2010, notably since September (Figure 15). Oil 
supply disruptions in Libya have pushed oil prices up further 
in early 2011. The latter is contributing to sustaining food price 
increases given their high energy intensity and the fact that 
some foods (notably corn, edible oils and sugar) are used to 
produce biofuels, a key alternative to oil. 
Agricultural prices reached 17 percent above their June 2008 
peak in February 2011, but prices appear to have softened 
somewhat albeit with some markets experiencing volatility 
month-to-month. The food index as a whole has increased 40 
percent since June 2010 through April 2011 despite a recent 
retreat after reaching its 2008 peak in February 2011 (Figure 
15).18 Food prices fell in March but rose again in April mainly 
due to a strengthening in grain markets.19 In early May, prices 
fell for most agricultural products but, as stocks of major grains 
remain low, prices could rise again if the 2011/12 crop outlook 
deteriorates. Despite the magnitudes, however, the current price 
increases remain smaller than the 2007/08 increases (Figure 16).
Meanwhile, oil prices continued climbing up with the average 
oil price index rising almost 50 percent between June 2010 
and April 2011. Ongoing political strife in the Middle East and 
North Africa suggests continued upward pressure on oil prices, 
although an expected temporary fall-off in demand from 
Japan (in the aftermath of the natural disaster) will likely help 
diminish pressures temporarily. However, demand for liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) will increase as it is one of the substitute 
energy sources for nuclear power generation in Japan. Some of 
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18 Prices for wheat, maize, and soybeans fell by 25 percent, 14 percent, and 12 percent 
from recent peaks to mid March.
19 Wheat prices rose 6 percent due to drought affecting the winter crop in US, Europe 
and China; while maize and sorghum prices increased 9–10 percent due to wet-weather 
induced late plantings.
figure 15. international food and Energy pricesl
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figure 16. price Spikes of 2007/08 and 2010/11
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the MENA countries are large producers and exporters of LNG 
and are likely to benefit from the positive terms of trade shock. 
Others are likely to pay more for energy imports. 
mACrOECONOmiC impliCATiONS Of riSiNG GlObAl 
fOOd priCES
The recent price increases in international food prices have 
macroeconomic implications for the countries in MENA. 
They have increased import bills, and put pressure on inflation 
and government spending, in those cases when governments 
subsidize food. Recent food price increases have also affected 
poor households’ ability to meet food requirements, increasing 
the chance of malnutrition in the region.
Wheat accounts for the largest share in the value of MENA’s 
total grain consumption (see Annex Table 2). Wheat alone 
represents more than half of both domestic grain consumption 
and imports in market year 2010,20 and nearly half of MENA’s 
domestic wheat consumption was imported. Rice—the second 
most consumed grain—represents 16.7 percent of total grain 
consumption, followed by corn accounting for 15 percent of 
total grain consumption, and barley accounting for 10.2 percent. 
In terms of imports, corn takes the second place with 19.6 
percent of total grain imports, followed by rice which represents 
15.3 percent of the total (see Annex Table 2). At the regional 
level, the highest dependency on imports is for corn, with more 
than two thirds of domestic corn consumption being imported.
The assessment of ex ante vulnerability considers increases in 
international grains, oils, meat, and sugar prices in market year 
2010 relative to the previous market year.21 Over this period 
wheat prices surged nearly 30 percent, corn prices surged 53 
percent, sorghum rose 32 percent, and barley prices rose 27 
percent (Table 5). The increase in rice prices was more muted, at 
7 percent. The increase in edible oil prices was also significant, 
with sunflower seed oil prices up 54 percent, rapeseed prices 
up 50 percent, soybean oil prices up 40 percent, and palm oil 
prices up 46 percent so far in the market year 2010. Sugar 
prices were up 39 percent, while beef prices rose 22 percent. 
The only prices that have declined in market year 2010 are 
olive oil and poultry prices. 
Based on the increases in food prices for the market year 
2010 above, the impact on the import bill as a share of GDP 
Table 5. international food price increases in 2010
percent
grains
Barley 27.3
Corn 53.1
rice, Milled 7.0
Wheat 29.9
sorghum 31.6
edible oils
olive –5.3
palm 46.1 
rapeseed 49.9
soybean 39.9
sunflower seed 54.2
sugar 39.0
Meat
Beef 21.5
poultry –0.9
Source: WB dECpg
in the MENA region is estimated at 0.6 percent of GDP, and 
1.4 percent of international reserves,22 with grains making the 
largest contribution, followed by edible oils, sugar and meat 
(Table 6). Oil importers are expected to be hardest hit by 
the increase in food prices. The increase in the import bill is 
estimated to be 1.2 percent of GDP, with half of the increase 
attributed to the impact of higher grain prices. The expected 
increase in the import bill of the developing oil exporters as a 
result of higher food product prices is estimated at 0.8 percent 
of GDP and 2.3 percent of international reserves. Increases in 
prices of edible oils and sugar account for more than half of the 
increase in the import bill. The GCC countries are expected to 
be least impacted by the higher food prices at the macro level 
as they have small populations and high per capita incomes. 
The overall impact on the GCC is estimated to be 0.3 percent 
of GDP and 0.5 percent of reserves, with the largest shock 
coming from the increase in sugar prices. 
A critical consideration in identifying the MENA countries most 
vulnerable to commodity price shocks at the macroeconomic 
20 Market year refers to the 2010/11 market year which runs from July to June.
21 The assessment assumes that the 2010 market year average is equal to the average 
prices observed so far in the market year to February 2011.
22 International reserves exclude gold.
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because it has lower cereal import dependence and its fiscal 
position has improved as rising oil prices have increased its oil 
revenues, but the government’s recent removal of widespread 
price subsidies on oil products, electricity, water, gas, bread 
and other basic products is expected to transmit commodity 
price increases to domestic consumer prices to a higher degree 
than in the past.
CONSumEr vulNErAbiliTy TO GlObAl COmmOdiTy 
priCE iNCrEASES
Food security has been featured prominently in public policy 
discussions in the MENA region, as food production in the 
region is far lower than domestic demand, making the region 
heavily reliant on imports, and malnutrition rates are high. 
According to data published by FAO in 2008, most MENA 
countries import at least 50 percent of consumed food calories. 
Of particular concern is the 40 percent rise in the cereal 
price index and the 77 percent rise in the sugar price index 
in the second half of 2010.24 Together, these two commodities 
comprise roughly 61 percent of per capita caloric consumption 
in the region, which is seven percentage points higher than the 
worldwide average. At the same time, roughly 58 percent of 
consumed cereal and 75 percent of consumed sugar come from 
level is the country’s relative exposure to food price and 
quantity risk as a function of fiscal balances and dependence 
on food imports.23 A country’s fiscal position determines its 
ability to cushion price shock impacts on the economy as 
well as on households. Grain imports are used as a proxy for 
food imports because MENA is the largest net grain importer 
in the world (13 million metric tons more than Asia in 2010) 
and because 50 percent of MENA’s per capita daily caloric 
intake comes from cereals alone. Countries with high cereal 
import dependency and large fiscal deficits are found to be 
most vulnerable at the macroeconomic level a priori, assuming 
that the full import cost associated with the price increase is 
absorbed by the national budgets and there are no other fiscal 
shocks. The analysis suggests that the MENA countries most 
vulnerable to a sustained food price surge are largely among 
the MENA oil importers, notably Jordan, and Lebanon, and 
developing oil exporters, such as Yemen, Iraq and Syria (Figure 
17). Less vulnerable are typically the GCC countries, with high 
quantity risk but currently low price risk as rising oil prices 
have eased pressure on fiscal balances. 
Egypt and Morocco face high price risk, but their quantity risk 
is lower due to higher domestic production levels. Nonetheless, 
over the medium to long-run, water scarcity and climate change 
will stress domestic production, and thereby raise quantity 
risk. Iran appears least vulnerable among MENA countries 
Table 6. impact of international food prices on the import bill 
(percent of gdp and international reserves)
2010 gdp
international 
reserves 2010 gdp 
international 
reserves
Mena gcc
total 0.62 1.44 total 0.25 0.45
grains 0.27 0.63 grains 0.07 0.12
oils 0.17 0.40 oils 0.06 0.12
Meat 0.04 0.09 Meat 0.02 0.04
sugar 0.14 0.32 sugar 0.09 0.17
developing oil exporters oil importers
total 0.78 2.28 total 1.15 4.39
grains 0.33 0.98 grains 0.59 2.32
oils 0.22 0.61 oils 0.35 1.23
Meat 0.05 0.14 Meat 0.05 0.24
sugar 0.19 0.55 sugr 0.15 0.59
Source: WB dECpg.
23 The assessment is based on World Bank (2011c). Price risk is the risk that grain 
prices will be prohibitively high, making purchase difficult even though quantity is 
available on world markets. Quantity risk is the risk of food not being available, even if 
there are sufficient funds for purchase.
24 FAO Food Price Indices: Measured by percent change from June 2010–March/April 
2011.
figure 17. macro level vulnerability of mENA Countries 
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Notes: grains import dependence is measured as net grain imports as a share of total grains 
consumption, using Usda data for 2010. 
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imports (Figure 18). In 2007, the MENA region was the largest 
net importer of cereals in the world.
Heavy dependence on imported food implies that surging 
international prices can place significant upward pressure on 
national and household budgets, depending on the level of 
domestic consumption subsidies and the pass-through from 
international to retail price.25 Net food buyers, mostly the urban 
population and the rural poor, will likely be hardest hit because 
they typically spend anywhere from a third to two thirds of 
their income on food. Also, a sustained surge in prices is likely 
to lead to an increase in poverty because a large number of 
people live close to the poverty line. But the magnitude of the 
impact depends on the degree to which governments subsidize 
and regulate domestic prices of these food commodities,26 and 
many other country-specific factors including domestic supply 
chain functioning, infrastructure and exchange rate movements. 
With substantial increases in international prices of a broad 
range of foods,27 and fast-growing domestic food demand,28 
some countries in MENA have been facing fiscal as well 
as domestic inflationary pressures (Crowley 2010). The 
fiscal pressures vary by country as some governments have 
been more successful than others in cutting consumption 
subsidies, and targeting the poor. Most MENA countries have 
introduced reforms since the 1980s. Some measures such as 
self-targeting, increasing prices by stealth, subsidy rationing 
and replacing subsidies with cash transfers, succeeded in 
reducing the subsidy burden, but many others failed and in 
some cases measures were withdrawn after public pressure. 
Even when changes were achieved, reforms remained partial, 
as all MENA countries still offer at least some consumer 
price subsidies,29 and social assistance schemes remain 
poor at channeling resources to the needy. This year many 
governments responded to the political turmoil with further 
increases in food subsidies, further straining fiscal budgets 
(see Table 3).30
Price controls however have not been able to prevent the increase 
in domestic food prices. In a number of MENA countries, food 
and general inflation have been high over the past five years, 
and in most cases annual food price inflation surpasses CPI 
inflation (Figure 19). To help households deal with the burden of 
domestic food price increases MENA governments have relied 
on cash transfers and other forms of social protection measures 
(Lampietti et al. 2011). More recently, most governments 
increased transfers and some of them increased wages of public 
servants and unemployment benefits (Table 3). 
hOw ExpOSEd ArE CONSumErS TO iNTErNATiONAl 
priCE fluCTuATiONS?
International food price shocks are a risk for consumers 
in MENA as these shocks have been transmitted to various 
degrees to domestic food prices in nearly all MENA countries 
(Figure 20, see Annex for details). The strongest pass-through 
effects31 of an increase in world food prices have been observed 
25 In MENA countries, the cost of importing grain sometimes does not fall upon the 
consumer because governments often regulate prices. Thus, part of the food-price risk is 
absorbed at the country-level as fiscal risk.
26 MENA governments use a variety of measures to control domestic prices of food 
(see Lampietti et al. (2011)). Consumer subsidies and price controls are widely used but 
so are tax cuts on food grains, food grain stock changes, and export restrictions or bans.
27 See most recent Global Economic Prospects (World Bank 2011b).
28 Due to high population growth, food consumption in MENA is growing at a faster 
pace than food demand of all other region except Africa. However, unlike Africa which 
can rely on domestic production of food, MENA is highly dependent on food imports. 
Furthermore, in the case of cereals, foreign supply is concentrated in five exporters—
Argentina, Australia, Canada, EU and US.
29 Jordan offers bread subsidies. In Egypt, wheat subsidies come in the form of bread 
sold by bakeries in predominantly urban areas and flour, sold from warehouses to rural 
households. Morocco subsidizes sugar, wheat and bread only. In Tunisia, the government 
subsidizes semolina, traditional bread, reconstituted packaged milk, and generic grain oil 
(see Kelly 2009).
30 Bahrain, Egypt and Algeria increased food subsidies. Kuwait offered free food for 
13 months through a discount price program. Jordan offered new food subsidies worth 
$550 million.
31 It is worthwhile to highlight that there is not always a perfect one-to-one match 
between pass-through and actual observed inflation. This is because the methodology 
for estimating the pass-through uses historical time series data. The coefficients report 
‘average’ pass-through effects over the past decade. But if a country is recently subsidizing 
or intervening in the food market, there will be a gap between the expected pass-through 
(coefficients) and the actual pass-through (observed food inflation).
figure 18. household and Country food vulnerability
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Source: national statistical offices, Usda, and other.
Notes: share of household food expenditures in total household consumption (vertical axis) 
are from the latest available data often for urban centers. shares of net cereal imports in 
domestic consumption (horizontal axis) are the averages from 2009–2010. 
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in West Bank and Gaza (WBG),32 Iraq, Djibouti, Egypt, and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In these countries the pass-
through coefficients are above 0.4 percent, indicating high 
vulnerability of households to world food price shocks. The 
pass-through is smaller but still sizable, varying between 
0.2 and 0.4 percent, for a large group of MENA countries, 
including Morocco, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Yemen, and all GCC 
countries other than UAE. This indicates a high degree 
of vulnerability of households to international food price 
increases in virtually all MENA countries. Only a few countries 
have low pass-through coefficients. In particular, in Algeria 
and Tunisia, international food prices have had little effect 
on domestic prices. Government policies including subsidies 
effectively safeguard against price transmission in Algeria, 
while domestic food inflation is contained by subsidies and 
appropriate monetary policy in Tunisia. 
Analysis of price movements over the past 6 years finds that 
a decline in international food prices transmit slowly into 
domestic food markets in MENA. A common finding is that 
in virtually all countries prices are highly downwardly rigid, 
the only exceptions being UAE and Yemen. This downward 
rigidity is often a common feature of price transmissions 
for agricultural and other commodities, including energy 
(Peltzman, 2000). The reasons underlying the apparent 
asymmetric transmission of prices are often complex and 
require further study (Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel, 2004), but 
a number of factors highlighted in the literature could explain 
this phenomenon in MENA:
  An adjustment problem somewhere at the wholesale and 
retail level, causing domestic prices to be downwardly 
rigid;33
  Uncertainty over whether food price shocks are permanent 
or transitory, along with political uncertainty in some 
MENA countries, exacerbate market reluctance to respond 
to downward food price signals; 
figure 19. Annual price Changes in mENA
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Note: the annual inflation rates for most countries are until January or February 2011. data 
for oman, iraq, and iran are until december 2010; for lebanon, libya and West Bank and 
gaza until november 2010; and for Yemen until october 2010. no food price data for libya is 
available; however, anecdotal evidence suggests very high food inflation rates. 
figure 20. pass-through of food prices into domestic food prices 
in mENA
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the effect of a world food price shock fades out after one year. the time period for the 
estimates is from 2000–2011. the time period is shorter for lebanon, djibouti, Yemen, syria, 
iraq, oman, Qatar, and UaE.
32 West Bank and Gaza’s high pass-through in the context of currently low domestic 
food inflation (less than 5 percent) is likely due to the recent easing of restrictions on the 
entry of consumer goods.
33 For example, in Iraq FAO (2009) finds that changes in the wholesale price are not 
met with proportional changes in retail price.
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  Government interventions to support lower consumer prices 
and/or non-competitive practices in the domestic market;
  Price declines may be relatively rare, as prices may trend 
upward, making estimation of the impact of declines in 
international prices on domestic prices difficult.
Consumers in most MENA countries have been significantly 
affected by food price increases since the 2006 global food 
crisis. With the exception of Morocco, all countries have 
experienced an increase in their domestic food prices by 
more than 20 percent since December 2006 (Figure 21), and 
Djibouti, Egypt and Iran have experienced extreme (over 40 
percent) food price increases.34 Rising world food prices have 
been a major factor behind increases in domestic food prices, 
typically explaining some 20 to 30 percent of the variation in 
domestic prices. International prices have been a particularly 
strong driver of food inflation in Iraq and West Bank and Gaza, 
accounting for over 50 percent of the food inflation, followed 
by Egypt, Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates (over 40 
percent of the food inflation). And except for Tunisia and 
Algeria, exchange rate depreciation has been a minor factor 
in domestic food inflation. However, other domestic factors 
also play a major role in explaining food inflation in nearly 
all MENA countries. These include procurement legislation 
and methods that are inflexible, outdated and costly in some 
countries; poor logistics that result in cost increases; lack of 
monitoring of supply-side developments; poor forecasting 
of prices shocks; inadequate stockpiling practices; and 
insufficient use of financial instruments to establish virtual 
stockpiles (Lampietti et al. 2011). 
Investments in domestic market infrastructure may help 
to reduce domestic food prices in the medium-run. These 
investments would be very country-specific and depend on the 
local cost-build up of imported food commodities. It is likely 
that inefficiencies in the transport and handling infrastructure 
might contribute to the cost of imported food commodities. 
The country-specific identification of major infrastructural 
bottlenecks (such as ports, roads, or administrative barriers, 
including procurement) may therefore be advantageous. Other 
areas of focus include regional trade to smoothen supply and 
cereal stock shortages, improve overall supply chain efficiency, 
and eventually create instruments and build capacity to engage 
in modern price risk management (World Bank, 2009b). A 
review of successful examples and an assessment of the effective 
demand for these focus areas would be a useful first step. 
figure 21. decomposition of domestic food price increase in 
mENA since december 2006 (pre 2007–08 food crisis)
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Note: the figure shows accumulated percentage increase in domestic food prices since 
december 2006 until october 2009–February 2011 (depending on country data availability). 
the increase in domestic food prices is then decomposed into the effects of world food 
prices, the domestic exchange rate, and other factors using variance decomposition. the 
time period for most countries is 2000–2011. the time period for lebanon, djibouti, Yemen, 
syria, iraq, oman, Qatar, and UaE is shorter.
34 As the price transmission mechanism typically takes about one year, some of the 
recent increases in international food prices may have not yet have been fully transmitted 
into domestic markets.
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, can be obtained by inverting the 
equation as follows:
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1
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The logic behind the equation is to discount for the effects 
of domestic inflation, including inertia or expectations. For 
example, in the case of strong domestic factors or expectations 
driving inflation (β ≈ 1), the role of world food price transmission 
would be small. On the other hand, if there are insignificant 
domestic factors (β ≈ 0) then the pass-through can be measured 
by simply summing up the coefficients. 
In addition to world food prices, exchange rate shocks are 
important in determining inflation. If the domestic currency 
depreciates (appreciates), international food price increases 
will have a stronger (weaker) pass-through effect. This is a 
significant consideration, because some of the inflationary 
effects could be due to domestic currency devaluations, rather 
than a direct effect of an increase in world food prices. 
A second consideration is to take advantage of findings 
on food price transmission (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005). 
One particularly important area is asymmetric food price 
transmission, wherein increases or decreases in commodity 
prices are considered as separate variables. Albers et al. 
(2011) provide evidence of non-linearity of international food 
price transmission into domestic prices for a number of South 
Mediterranean countries.
Based on these two considerations, the baseline model is 
transformed into a threshold regression, which controls for 
lagged annual percentage changes in the domestic exchange rate, 
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, and allows studying asymmetric food price transmission:
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To facilitate a consistent interpretation across MENA 
countries, we derive estimates of the pass-through coefficients 
from cumulative impulse response functions and forecast error 
variance decompositions to assess their relative magnitude. 
ANNEx ii: fOOd priCE pASS-ThrOuGh mEThOdOlOGy
Empirical Approach
Recent analysis on food-price pass-through (e.g. Ferrucci et al. 
2010) finds that international commodity prices were the main 
determinant of producer and consumer food price inflation in 
the Euro area. Albers et al. (2011) find evidence of positive food 
price pass-through into consumer prices for a number of South 
Mediterranean countries. Crowley (2010) analyses structural 
determinants of inflation in the Middle East, Northern Africa 
and Central Asia. He finds that commodity prices exhibit a 
strong and mostly significant impact on domestic inflation. 
By contrast, international fuel prices do not explain the rising 
inflation trend.
Methodologically, analyzing food price pass-through is related 
to the broader literature of energy prices or exchange rate pass-
through (see for example Chen, 2009; Campa and Goldberg, 
2005; De Gregorio et al., 2007; McCarthy, 2007). The empirical 
strategies typically focus on the estimates and interpretation 
of short-run coefficients. Long-run co-integration evidence 
is rare, particularly evidence on the relationship between 
international and domestic food prices. One reason may be 
that food items are typically not perfectly arbitraged. Not only 
are the costs of arbitrage high, but also institutional factors 
and policy influences domestic prices, rendering long run 
relationships unstable (Ardeni, 1989). 
Thus, for the present analysis, we explicitly focus on the short-
run correlations between international and domestic food 
prices. As a baseline model for the calculations of the pass-
through effects, we consider the following autoregressive 
model:
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +
= =
∑ ∑p p wfpt i
i
i
i
tα β γ ε
1 1
k k
t-i t-i
where ∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +
= =
∑ ∑p p wfpt i
i
i
i
tα β γ ε
1 1
k k
t-i t-i
 is the annual percentage change of the food 
consumer price index, ∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +
= =
∑ ∑p p wfpt i
i
i
i
tα β γ ε
1 1
k k
t-i t-i represents lagged annual 
percentage changes of the food prices, to account for domestic 
factors and expectations, and ∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +
= =
∑ ∑p p wfpt i
i
i
i
tα β γ ε
1 1
k k
t-i t-i  is the annual percentage 
change of the World Bank’s international food price index, 
which is calculated from food prices measured in current US$. 
The pass-through from an international food price shock to 
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The coefficients show the model’s predicted adjustment of 
domestic food prices to changes in world food prices and 
the exchange rate. In most countries, the food price pass-
through effects fade out after about one year. Our pass-through 
coefficients are therefore identical, or very similar, to those 
that can be directly obtained from the equation. 
When estimating the model, we use monthly data from 
December 1998 to early 2011 for most countries, allowing 
for lags. The cumulative lag structure is chosen to minimize 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and by means of lag 
exclusion tests. The optimal lag length is found to be k = 12. 
In a few cases, different lag structures are suggested, but for 
simplicity and comparability we use the same lag length.The 
overall results are robust to changes in the lag structure. For 
Lebanon, Djibouti, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, and the 
UAE, the estimation period is shorter, which forces us to use 
less lags because of data restrictions. For these countries, the 
results are sensitive to outliers. We selectively employ impulse 
dummies to correct for outliers. We also use time trends when 
significant. Because we estimate the model in annual growth 
rates, we explicitly control for seasonal factors. 
food price data
Historical price data for MENA is scarce and for some 
countries not readily available. Monthly consumer price index 
(CPI) and food consumer price data were compiled from 
various sources for 18 MENA countries. The primary sources 
of data are the national statistical offices, and collected over 
time by the World Bank staff. The consumer price data was also 
complemented with information from the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), and updates provided by the statistical 
offices themselves. 
Efforts were made to ensure data accuracy. Specifically, 
we compared trend and annual growth consistency for the 
different series. The data has also been corroborated with 
market information on food prices and field documentation 
from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
In general, preference was given to the original data provided 
by the national statistical offices. For Lebanon, data collected 
by World Bank staff was utilized. For Iran, food price data 
compiled from the Central Bank was used. There is no 
information available on food prices for Libya.35 
In some cases, specifically Djibouti, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Tunisia, the data in different series shows small divergences 
from the original series due to rebasing. For example, the 
CPI data for Tunisia is rebased to the year 2005, to make it 
consistent with the data available from the national statistical 
office. Similarly, for Djibouti, the data has been re-based to 
March-April 1999, to ensure consistency with official data. In 
a few cases, missing observations were interpolated. 
Transmission of food price Shocks in mENA is relatively 
fast
In MENA the dynamics and the magnitude of the food 
price pass-through largely vary by country, but the overall 
transmission of international food prices into domestic food 
prices is relatively fast. The transmission takes about one year 
to reach full impact, but in many cases is already apparent 
after about 3–6 months. Annex Figure 1a-c plot the percentage 
change in domestic food prices to a one percent increase in 
international food prices by MENA country group:
In oil importers, pass-through effects appear relatively 
pronounced, but the speed of transmission varies (Annex 
Figure 1a). 
  Djibouti, one of the poorest countries in the region with 
a fragile food security situation, shows the strongest 
pass-through effects both in terms of magnitude and 
transmission speed. Nevertheless, overall food inflation 
has remained relatively low because of an awareness 
campaign aimed at inducing wholesalers and retailers to 
limit their margins thereby insulating domestic prices from 
international price movements. Furthermore, production 
from government-owned farms in Ethiopia and Sudan has 
helped stabilize wheat and bread prices. 
  In Egypt, food price pass-through is significant and visible 
after a few months. After about one year an international 
price shock reaches its full strength. A one percent increase 
in international food prices increases the domestic price of 
food by more than 0.44 percent. In contrast, a decrease 
in international food prices has little effects on domestic 
prices. The relatively high levels of food inflation are also 
35 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is available until November 2010 in the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database.
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due to domestic factors, such as pressure from growing 
demand and unfavorable weather events. 
  In Jordan, food price transmission starts to pick-up 
after about 6 months. The overall effects after one year 
are strong. A one percent increase in world food prices 
increases the domestic prices by more than 0.39 percent. 
The currently low levels of food inflation, despite high-
pass through effects, can be explained by a number of 
government interventions, such as consumer subsidies, 
release of grain reserves, and tax reductions of several 
agricultural inputs, including fuel. 
  In Lebanon, a one percent increase in world food prices 
translates into a 0.18 increase in prices of domestic 
foodstuff; high government subsidies for food and fuel 
(Albers and Peeters, 2011) that absorb international shocks 
may help to explain these pass-through effects. 
  In Morocco, food price transmission typically builds up 
after about 8 months, reaching magnitudes similar to those 
Annex figure 1a. Oil importers’ food price pass-through dynamics
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Note: the figure shows the percentage increase (decrease) in domestic food prices for a one percent increase (decrease) in world food prices over a 12-month window. data for most countries 
are for 2000–2011. in the cases of WBg, djibouti and lebanon however we rely on shorter time series.
annExEs
FaCing ChallEngEs and opportUnitiEs
33
observed for Egypt and Jordan. A one percent increase in 
world food prices lifts domestic prices by some 0.39 percent. 
The fact that food inflation currently remains subdued can 
be attributed to a number of factors: the government’s 
decision to use subsidies to regulate domestic food prices, 
suspension of customs duties on cereal imports, suspension 
of local tax collection targeting fresh food traded in 
wholesale markets, and price control operations to contain 
price increases resulting from speculation. 
  In Tunisia, food pass-through is small. Price controls 
and food subsidies seem to effectively undermine the 
transmission of international food prices into domestic 
prices. A one percent increase in international food 
prices increases the domestic price of food by only 0.06 
percent. 
  Finally, in WBG food price transmission both in terms of 
speed and magnitude appears as one of the strongest in 
the region reaching above 0.6 percent after 12 months. 
Nevertheless, loosening of restrictions on the entry 
of consumer goods along with government and donor 
interventions may help to curb domestic food prices.
In developing oil exporters, the pass-through effects range 
from small in Algeria to large in Iraq (Annex Figure 1b). 
  In Algeria, rising international food prices have little 
overall effect on domestic prices. Algeria’s food subsidies 
and other government interventions effectively protect the 
consumers from food price shocks. 
  In Iran, food price transmission is gradual and reaches 
its peak after 10 months. A one percent increase in 
international prices translates into a 0.3 percent increase 
in domestic food prices. A more significant agricultural 
sector may explain the weaker price transmission. The 
pronounced increase in overall food inflation is attributed 
to reform of the local subsidy system, which increased 
Annex figure 1b. developing Oil Exporters’ food price pass-through dynamics
algeria iran
–0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
–0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
iraq syria
–0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
–0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Yemen
–0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Note: the figure shows the percentage increase (decrease) in domestic food prices for a one percent increase (decrease) in world food prices over a 12-month window. data for algeria and iran 
are for 2000–2011; other countries use shorter time series.
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consumer and transport costs of food, as well as to 
international price increases.36
  In Iraq, food price transmission appears to have a step-
wise effect. Pass-through is relatively slow during the first 
6 months, but becomes quite significant after 12 months. 
The country has in effect one of the strongest pass-through 
effects in the region. A one percent increase of world food 
prices increases domestic prices by almost 0.5 percent. 
The stepwise effects might be explained by the fact that 
Iraq is a net food importer but partly relies on a food ration 
system. 
  In Syria the pass-through is relatively fast, but appears 
less pronounced than for other countries, which can be 
attributed to domestic policies. In Syria, transmission is 
determined not so much by cereals, but by sugar and oil 
foodstuff. Syria is quasi self-sufficient in wheat production 
and the government controls the domestic price of wheat. 
  Similarly, in Yemen, the pass-through is relatively fast. 
Yemen is among the ten countries in the world with the 
highest rates of food insecurity thus explaining the rapid 
transmission. To address the looming impact of food price 
increases the government decided to subsidize seed. In 
Yemen a decline in world food prices appears to transmit 
into the domestic market. 
In GCC countries, world food price pass-through to domestic 
prices is relatively slower when compared to other countries in 
the region (Annex Figure 1c):
  In Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, pass-through 
effects become visible after about 7 month. By contrast, 
in Oman pass-through effects appear after just 3 months. 
In all these countries, food price pass-through is typically 
below 0.4 percent. 
  In UAE pass-through effects are relatively fast and 
stronger than the GCC average. UAE is also among the 
few countries where a world food price decline rapidly 
transmits into the domestic market. 
robustness
To get a sense of the robustness of the estimates, we use 
Monte Carlo simulation (1,000 iterations) and bootstrap 
standard errors for the 6 and 12-month food price pass-
through coefficients. The results are displayed in Annex 
Table 3. For many countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, 
36 In December 2010, the Government of Iran removed widespread subsidies on oil 
products, electricity, water, gas, bread and other basic products.
Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and WBG) the estimated 
12-month pass-through elasticities are statistically significant 
at the 5-percent level. For the other countries the pass-through 
coefficients are not significant (which may either be attributed 
to limited price transmission because of policy interventions, or 
short time-series, particularly relevant in the case of Lebanon, 
Djibouti, and Yemen). 
As an alternative to the World Bank’s Food Price Index, we 
also used the FAO world food price index. Both indices are 
similar, however, the FAO index shows higher peaks in 2011. 
The main effect of using the FAO index is that the pass-through 
coefficients remain of similar magnitude, while the standard 
errors of the coefficients increase. Using disaggregated world 
price index data both from the FAO and World Bank also works 
for cereals, but produces lower pass-through coefficients than 
those obtained from aggregated indices (which is consistent 
with a lower share of cereal than total food consumption in 
household expenditures).
The market rate vis-à-vis the euro works better empirically 
than the US$ market exchange rate, or the nominal effective 
exchange rate. We suspect that this is because even in oil-
producing MENA countries, a significant share of food 
imports is denominated in Euro. We suspect that the nominal 
effective exchange rate (which is a trade-weighted average 
of the nominal exchange rate) may not be a good proxy for 
import prices because it also contains export data. We do not 
find the type of exchange rate choice significantly impacting 
the size of the pass-through coefficients.
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Annex figure 1c. GCC food price pass-through dynamics
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Note: the figure shows the percentage increase (decrease) in domestic food prices for a one percent increase (decrease) in world food prices over a 12-month window. data for saudi arabia, 
Bahrain, and kuwait are for 2000–2011. in the cases of oman, Qatar, and UaE we rely on shorter time series.
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Annex Table 3. food price pass-through Coefficients in mENA
Country and group
6-month food price pass-through 12-month food price pass-through
World price increase World price decrease World price increase World price decrease
gC
C 
co
un
tri
es
Bahrain 0.050 0.057 0.349 0.051
(0.057) (0.036) (0.113) (0.034)
kuwait 0.107 0.016 0.279 0.020
(0.081) (0.029) (0.128) (0.029)
oman 0.341 0.079 0.213 0.075
(0.142) (0.063) (0.130) (0.074)
Qatar 0.286 0.182 0.355 0.220
(0.125) (0.085) (0.161) (0.099)
saudi arabia 0.144 0.033 0.266 0.023
(0.278) (0.024) (0.232) (0.021)
UaE 0.355 0.298 0.413 0.315
(0.178) (0.143) (0.202) (0.163)
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 o
il 
ex
po
rt
er
s
algeria 0.065 0.066 0.059 0.048
(0.077) (0.048) (0.072) (0.037)
iran 0.103 0.003 0.282 0.052
(0.081) (0.026) (0.116) (0.043)
iraq 0.122 0.062 0.497 0.055
(0.131) (0.083) (0.158) (0.100)
syria 0.163 0.052 0.261 0.100
(0.097) (0.053) (0.114) (0.067)
Yemen 0.393 0.147 0.311 0.234
(0.161) (0.177) (0.166) (0.192)
oi
l i
m
po
rt
er
s
djibouti 0.583 0.037 0.464 0.129
(0.180) (0.078) (0.183) (0.106)
Egypt 0.336 0.041 0.441 0.034
(0.124) (0.032) (0.140) (0.031)
Jordan 0.219 0.054 0.392 0.130
(0.102) (0.047) (0.118) (0.069)
lebanon 0.080 0.145 0.180 0.132
(0.172) (0.096) (0.209) (0.093)
Morocco 0.044 0.061 0.394 0.052
(0.063) (0.050) (0.121) (0.042)
tunisia 0.070 0.004 0.058 0.005
(0.092) (0.022) (0.092) (0.025)
WBg 0.475 0.015 0.658 0.017
(0.123) (0.034) (0.134) (0.040)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis; bold numbers indicate significant at the 5 percent level.
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